题目Imitation dynamics of vaccine decision-making behaviors
based on the game theory：
报告人：加拿大罗瑞尔大学(Wilfrid Laurier University)陈玉明教授
摘要：Abstract: To investigate the imitation dynamics of vaccine uptake, an age
structured epidemic model based on game theory is proposed. The model is derived
under the assumption that the potential infection risk depends on the infection age.
The existence and local stability of equilibria are analyzed. A Hopf bifurcation may
occur from the endemic and vaccinator equilibrium. Our study shows that imitation
behavior is not the only reason to destabilize the system and bring about oscillations.
Infection age is another factor to produce the limit cycles. The results show how the
prevalence of the infection changes with respect to the infection age. This is a joint
work with Dr. Yang and Prof. Martcheva.